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INTRODUCTION
In a recent symposium article, Professor Jonah Gelbach dis-
cusses the problem that a litigant in the American adversarial
system can consult multiple expert witnesses on a given ques-
tion but only disclose the single most favorable opinion to the
fact finder (a jury, judge, or arbitrator).' He calls this the prob-
lem of "expert mining." In particular, Gelbach considers whether
a policy that requires litigants to disclose to the fact finder the
number of experts that they consulted might be a satisfactory
solution to the problem.2 Alternatively, Gelbach considers
whether an even more radical change to the American litigation
system-the exclusion of all expert opinions rendered after the
first one-might be necessary. 3 In doing so, Gelbach extensively
discusses my own work on this problem and the third solution I
developed in a 2010 article, Blind Expertise.4 There, I show that
expert mining is one part of a broader problem of expert bias,
and I propose a conditional-disclosure rule as the solution.5 This
Essay provides some analysis of Gelbach's framing of the prob-
lem, reviews the blinding proposal, and identifies the limits of
Gelbach's analyses.
f Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of
Law, crobertson@post.harvard.edu. I thank Professors Jonah Gelbach, Jim Greiner, and
David Marcus for helpful comments on prior drafts, and I thank Harvard Law School,
where I served as a visiting professor during the drafting of this Essay.
I Jonah B. Gelbach, Expert Mining and Required Disclosure, 81 U Chi L Rev 131,
131-32 (2014).
2 Id at 133.
3 Id.
4 Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 NYU L Rev 174 (2010).
5 Id at 178-80.
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I. EXPERT MINING AS ONE MECHANISM OF SELECTION BIAS
Professor Gelbach draws an analogy from the tactic of an
expert conducting multiple soil-sample tests and then reporting
only the favorable results (which he calls "individual data min-
ing") to the tactic of litigants consulting multiple experts but
designating only one for testimony (which he calls "expert min-
ing").6 Gelbach argues that the two tactics have "the same statis-
tical properties," since either one can allow a party to produce a
favorable result that may mislead a fact finder.7
However, these two practices have quite different epistemic,
economic, and strategic properties. First, unlike the results of a
valid scientific test, the likely opinions of an expert witness can
often be reliably predicted by lawyers prior to consulting the ex-
pert. This is because expert witnesses have track records-from
prior work with specific attorneys, attorney and expert word of
mouth, advertisements in particular media (for example, plain-
tiffs' bar magazines), reports of published cases and jury ver-
dicts, publications, and professional affiliations. Accordingly, in
many fields of expertise, experts tend to be identified as pro-
plaintiff or pro-defendant, with reliable track records for produc-
ing opinions for one side or the other.8
Second, the cost profile is quite different. A given expert can
presumably perform an additional soil test at little or no mar-
ginal cost. In contrast, it is much more expensive for a litigant to
hire another expert to render a new opinion. Expert opinions
have onerous startup costs, because experts and attorneys each
charge hundreds of dollars per hour. A new expert will require
several hours to learn the background facts of the case and to be
directed by the attorneys toward the appropriate legal question
before performing whatever research, tests, and analyses may
be required to actually form an opinion, which can then be com-
municated back to the attorney, who must then evaluate its favor-
ability. This process consumes both expert time and attorney
time. These costs per expert impede the strategy of expert min-
ing, limiting its practicability.
6 Id at 135-36.
7 Id.
8 See, for example, Aaron S. Kesselheim and David M. Studdert, Characteristics of
Physicians Who Frequently Act as Expert Witnesses in Neurologic Birth Injury Litigation,
108 Obstetrics & Gynecology 273, 275 (2006) (showing that only 21 percent of frequent
experts in neurologic birth injury cases "approached an even split of their caseload be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants").
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Finally, expert mining is somewhat risky. Gelbach himself
notes that, with regard to expert mining, "what little case law
exists is mixed."9 Indeed, he argues that it is "an open question
whether the Rules as written allow discovery of nontestifying
experts' identities."1o In my view, the attorney work product pro-
tections are quite substantial." However, there is still some risk
to a litigant that an expert-mining strategy will be revealed and
thereby used against the litigant at trial.
Thus, for all these reasons, a competent attorney often does
not draw randomly from the field of potential expert witnesses-
planning to simply draw again if the first one is unfavorable-as
that strategy would be wasteful and slightly risky. Instead, she
handpicks the one expert that is most likely to render a favora-
ble opinion, either because that expert is known to have strong
priors that tend to favor the litigant's side or because the expert
is known to be the most malleable to that litigant. As long as a
biased, malleable, or fair-but-luckily-favorable expert can be
found on the first try, a litigant can proceed to mislead the jury.
In this way, the analogy from the real world of expert wit-
nesses to data mining is rather weak, or perhaps applicable only
in a specialized set of cases in which the foregoing issues do not
arise. Accordingly, the potential reforms Gelbach considers-
disclosure of the number of experts consulted or a proscription
on subsequent opinions-are both rather weak solutions. Under
either regime, a competent attorney could still handpick a fa-
vorable and unrepresentative expert on her first draw.
Instead, as I argued in 2010, the broader concept of selec-
tion bias provides a stronger framework for thinking about the
epistemological and strategic issues in this domain.12 Regardless
of whether it is through a mechanism of handpicking and shaping
one expert or mining through multiple opinions, the impact on
the fact finder is the same. The ultimate judgment will be based
on the disclosed sample of unrepresentative expert opinions ra-
ther than the population of all opinions that were rendered or
could have been rendered through an unbiased sampling process.
A fact finder may thus be misled by the revealed opinions, mak-
ing false inferences about the state of knowledge in a given field.
9 Gelbach, 81 U Chi L Rev at 132 (cited in note 1).
10 Id at 135.
11 See Robertson, 85 NYU L Rev at 210, 213 & n 178 (cited in note 4).
12 Id at 184-85.
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To be sure, the adversarial process does not solve this prob-
lem, because in any given case it reveals two disagreeing ex-
perts, which overrepresents whichever side is in the minority of
expert opinion. A more robust solution is required.
II. THE BLINDED-EXPERT PROTOCOL
The blinded-expert protocol solves the selection bias prob-
lem and the malleability problem. (In Blind Expertise, I ex-
plained the malleability problem in terms of "affiliation bias"
and "compensation bias."13). Under this protocol, either litigant
may unilaterally and confidentially decide whether to utilize an
intermediary between itself and its potential expert witness. If
the litigant chooses to pay in advance for such a blinded-expert
opinion, the blinding intermediary would select an expert wit-
ness in an unbiased way. One way to perform this selection
would be to choose randomly from a prescreened list of compe-
tent experts. To further prevent the expert from being manipu-
lated by the litigant, the intermediary would ensure that the ex-
pert renders an opinion on the case without knowing which
litigant requested the opinion. This would solve the problem of
expert malleability.
Laboratory experiments have shown that this reform im-
proves experts' credibility with the fact finder, yielding more fa-
vorable outcomes at trial for litigants that choose this option.14 A
litigant's use of a blinded expert is thus likely to drive a more
favorable settlement, making it a rational strategy, which also
happens to improve litigation accuracy and legitimacy.
Most pertinent to Professor Gelbach's analysis, the blind-
expert protocol includes a conditional-disclosure rule. If the
opinion turns out to be unfavorable, the litigant need not dis-
close that opinion at all, and may instead proceed with a tradi-
tional unblinded expert (or settle the case). Allowing litigants to
retain discretion about whether to disclose the expert opinion
minimizes the risk of blinding to the litigant, making it more
likely to be utilized in a system dependent on the choices of ra-
tional actors.
Nonetheless, if a litigant receives a favorable blinded-expert
opinion and proposes to use it at trial, the litigant would be
13 Id at 184-88.
14 Christopher T. Robertson and David V. Yokum, The Effect of Blinded Experts on
Juror Verdicts, 9 J Empirical Legal Stud 765, 786 (2012).
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required to disclose all the other blinded opinions that it pro-
cured on the given question. A primary advantage of this reform
is that it does not require any changes to rules of evidence or
procedure; the disclosure mandate is already implicit in the
waiver provisions around the attorney work product doctrine.1
In short, litigants would not be allowed to claim that their ex-
pert was unbiased while also exploiting a selection bias.
Ultimately, Gelbach agrees that this disclosure mechanism
would work: "a well-crafted cross-examination would undermine
the credibility of the adversary's expert evidence when many ex-
perts are consulted. This would at least reduce the incentive to
use expert mining."16 Notice that there are two dynamics at play
here. Ex post, the disclosure rule prevents the fact finder from
being misled by the expert-mining tactic, because the fact finder
can discount the favorable blinded opinion in light of the unfa-
vorable blinded opinions. Thus, the reliability of the blinding
mechanism is preserved as it prevents a selection bias. As Gel-
bach writes, "To the extent that additional fully disclosed expert
testimony increases the fact finder's information, we can expect
a beneficial increase in accuracy."7
Ex ante, the disclosure rule also reduces the incentive for
litigants to undertake expert mining within the blinding system.
Conditional upon getting an unfavorable initial blinded-expert
opinion, the litigant faces a choice between (a) reverting back to
the traditional litigation process with an unblinded expert (hiding
the unfavorable blinded opinion in attorney work product pro-
tections); or (b) taking another unbiased draw from the blinded-
expert pool, in the hope that the second blinded expert will disa-
gree with the first (if so,both opinions will then be presented to
the fact finder). Option (b) would generally be unattractive to lit-
igants, because the second expert opinion has a cost, and it is
unlikely to disagree with the first opinion (assuming that the
blinded experts have a modicum of accuracy).18 Most importantly,
even if the second blinded expert disagrees with the first, a pair
of counterpoised blinded experts would not be very persuasive to
15 See Robertson, 85 NYU L Rev at 211-12 & nn 175, 176 (cited in note 4).
16 Gelbach, 81 U Chi L Rev at 145 (cited in note 1).
17 Id at 133.
18 The first blinded opinion has epistemic content for the litigant himself. Assuming
that issues in litigation have truth values, which can be detected reliably by blinded ex-
perts, the first blinded-expert opinion is the litigant's best evidence of what a second
blinded expert would say. Thus, a first unfavorable opinion portends a second unfavora-
ble opinion, making the expert-mining strategy unattractive.
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the fact finder, particularly compared to a single unblinded ex-
pert who could be hired instead under option (a).
Thus, if a litigant's first blinded expert provides an unfavor-
able opinion, the litigant is likely to revert back to option (a)-
the traditional litigation process with unblinded experts-or set-
tle the case. Expert mining is unlikely to occur within the blind-
ing system given the conditional-disclosure rule that I have
specified. Thus, the testimony of a blinded expert will be a
strong signal to the truth, one that largely solves the expert-
mining problem as an instance of the broader problem of expert
bias.
III. THE RELIABILITY OF BLINDED EXPERTS
Professor Gelbach takes issue with some of this analysis.'1
Analogizing to the false positives and false negatives of soil
tests, Gelbach supposes that each expert witness likewise has
two rates of error, depending on whether he renders positive or
negative opinions.20 For such scientific tests, the rates of error
can be determined by running the tests repeatedly on cases with
known truth. Gelbach further seems to assume that the litiga-
tion fact finder has prior knowledge about divergent error rates
and thus will discount certain opinions as less reliable, depend-
ing on their substance.21 Gelbach argues that, if a litigant knew
about the fact finder's prior belief about this disparity in the two
error rates, then the conditional-disclosure rule might not deter
19 Gelbach asserts that "Robertson is mistaken in suggesting that there is 'No Sig-
nal' sent to the fact finder when each party introduces blinded-expert evidence in its fa-
vor." Gelbach, 81 U Chi L Rev at 141-42 (cited in note 1). Gelbach here cites to another
part of my paper where, for exegetical purposes, I postulated that a given sort of blinded
expert might have a (single) error rate (say, 5 percent), and then demonstrated how ad-
versarial use of the blinding procedure could dramatically reduce the rate of errors. Id at
142 n 42, citing Robertson, 85 NYU L Rev at 217 (cited in note 4). In rare cases in which
each side procures a blinded opinion that is favorable to that side, the fact finder would
receive two disagreeing blinded-expert opinions. From the perspective of the analyst, the
blind procedure thus produces no signal on net and thus cannot lead the fact finder
astray. This adversarial use of the blinded procedure is one of its virtues compared to a
single court-appointed expert.
20 The analogy is to a "soil test on uncontaminated soil." Gelbach, 81 U Chi L Rev
at 136 (cited in note 1). Gelbach is correct to observe that "[e]ven two test results point-
ing in opposite directions can be very informative, if the [known] probabilities of false
negatives and false positives are sufficiently different." Id at 141 (emphasis added). The
bracketed insert is essential for Gelbach's epistemological point to be true.
21 Id. The blinded-expert protocol does not require such knowledge of the fact finder.
It simply requires that the fact finder regard blinded experts as more persuasive than
unblinded experts.
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a rational litigant from drawing again from the blind-expert pool
after receiving a first unfavorable opinion.22 Instead, he would go
back to the pool of blinded experts (that is, he would engage in
expert mining), hoping for a favorable opinion that would not be
fully offset by the unfavorable, discounted opinion.23
It bears emphasis that Gelbach and I agree that the
conditional-disclosure rule in the blinded-expert protocol would
nonetheless prevent the tactic from misleading the fact finder.24
As all blinded opinions will be disclosed to the fact finder, there
is no selection bias.
However, we apparently disagree on whether expert mining
would be likely to occur within the blinded-expert protocol at all.
Perhaps there are expert opinions like those that Gelbach has in
mind, in which the expert opinion itself has known rates of error
that diverge depending on the substance of the opinion (that is,
its positive or negative character). These cases would be distinct
from those in which the expert has made all sorts of discretion-
ary judgments about methods, datasets, samples, and criteria,
or is otherwise simply rendering an all-things-considered opin-
ion based on his experience and judgment.25 For such an expert
opinion, we do not have reference cases or a history of repeated
opinions, which could be used to discern the differential rates of
positive and negative errors.
The challenge, then, is to discern whether Gelbach's objec-
tion is more than a theoretical possibility and, if it is real,
whether it constitutes the exception or the rule. Gelbach pro-
vides no estimates of the prevalence of the sorts of cases he has
in mind. Indeed, a casual survey of common types of expert tes-
timony suggests that it is difficult to find such a case. Consider,
for example, the physician in a medical malpractice case who
renders an opinion about whether the defendant met the requi-
site standard of care. Or, consider the physician in the ubiqui-
tous auto-accident case or disability-benefits case, who must
evaluate whether the plaintiff is partially or permanently disa-
bled. With these sorts of medical-expert opinions, we have al-
ready accounted for a huge proportion of real world cases, and
22 Id at 141-42.
23 Id at 141 ("While Robertson suggests that, in general, required disclosure would
be sufficient to eliminate mining of blinded experts, this is too strong a claim.").
24 See Gelbach, 81 U Chi L Rev at 145 (cited in note 1).
25 See id at 147-48 (acknowledging "many other important contexts ... [in which
there is] variation in experts' good-faith opinions regarding subjective matters").
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there is no suggestion of known differential rates of false posi-
tives and negatives. 26
Or, consider the economist or accountant who opines about
the total amount of damages suffered, scaling them up for infla-
tion and down for the time value of money.27 Although we have
moved into the realm of the numerical, these estimates of a con-
tinuous variable (money) also do not seem amenable to Gel-
bach's notion of positive- and negative-error testing.
There are some domains in which we might expect, or at
least hope, that there are known rates of false positives and
false negatives.28 For example, fingerprint experts are ubiqui-
tous in criminal litigation and some civil litigation.29 In principle,
it would be easy enough to use known cases to create error-rate
estimates for fingerprint examiners as a whole, or for a particu-
lar examiner in a particular sort of case. (Note the difficulty in
even specifying the relevant basis for computed error rates.)
However, the profession of fingerprint examiners has largely re-
fused to adopt such scientific methods, preferring instead to in-
sist on infallibility.30 Even if the discourse surrounding this sort
of expert becomes more sophisticated, there will likely remain
dispute about the very validity of error rates themselves.31 Thus,
it is not clear how a fact finder would implement the sort of dis-
counting function that Gelbach has in mind.
26 See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis L Rev 1113, 1119 ("Half of the
experts in our data were medical doctors, and an additional 9% were other medical pro-
fessionals-clinical psychologists, rehabilitation specialists, dentists, etc.").
27 See id (noting that experts involved in "various aspects of business and finance"
accounted for 11 percent of the experts in the sample).
28 I have suggested elsewhere that in certain fields (such as radiology), the facts of
an actual litigation case could itself be reviewed by multiple experts and compared
against known cases, thereby allowing estimation of something like an error rate for the
particular case. Even this method is, however, distinct from suggesting that the expert
conveying this information has a knowable error rate. See Daniel J. Durand, et al, Ex-
pert Witness Blinding Strategies to Mitigate Bias in Radiology Malpractice Cases: A
Comprehensive Review of the Literature, 11 J Am Coll Radiology *3-4 (forthcoming
2014), online at http://www.jacr.org/article/S1546-1440(14)00248-8/abstract (visited July
30, 2014).
29 See 36 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 285 §1 (2014).
30 See United States v Mitchell, 365 F3d 215, 228 (3d Cir 2004) (discussing the tes-
timony of Simon Cole, who was critical of the field of fingerprint examination in part be-
cause it "did not recognize error rates" but instead attributed all errors to the incompe-
tence or corruption of particular examiners). See also id at 231 (mentioning testimony
about "the limited studies performed specifically to establish an error rate for fingerprint
identification").
31 Id at 239 ("[T]he existence of any error rate at all seems strongly disputed by
some latent fingerprint examiners.").
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A more profound point is that, even when an expert uses an
objective test with a known rate of error, the human factor often
intervenes in ways that are difficult to observe, much less quan-
tify.32 In the fingerprint domain in particular, research has
shown that the contextual information that police routinely pro-
vide to their examiners can color their decisions.33 The same fin-
gerprint examiner has been shown to render inconsistent opin-
ions on the same task depending on the contextual information
at hand.34 Similarly, we might suppose that forensic DNA testi-
mony would be the paradigmatic case of objectivity. However, it
turns out that this domain is also susceptible to cognitive biases,
as human factors intervene.35 Perhaps most analogous to Gel-
bach's soil-sampling example is the forensic testing of contra-
band, which is used to determine whether the contraband is an
illegal drug. Even here, chemists have been known to violate the
test assumptions by sampling nonhomogeneous populations.36 In
those contexts, the optimal "known" error rates are therefore
unreliable.
One might hope that rigorous thinking about error rates
would come from econometricians or statisticians, such as those
in a class action case, who must determine whether racialized
block voting exists in a jurisdiction, or determine whether mi-
nority workers are suffering a disparate impact from their em-
ployer's policy. Here, at least, we might hope that the expert will
produce confidence intervals or, even better, a probability distri-
bution across all possible values from which the fact finder could
compute something like a rate of false positives or false nega-
tives. However, these error-rate estimates are themselves likely
to be biased by the expert. Professor Jim Greiner explains three
problems: "[F]irst, an analyst fitting a regression sees the litiga-
tion answer before she assesses goodness of fit; second, deciding
whether a model is adequate for the data requires judgment;
32 See Itiel E. Dror, David Charlton, and Ailsa E. P6ron, Contextual Information
Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 Forensic Sci Intl
74, 76 (2006).
33 See Itiel E. Dror, et al, Cognitive Issues in Fingerprint Analysis: Inter- and Intra-
expert Consistency and the Effect of a "Target" Comparison, 208 Forensic Sci Intl 10, 11
(2011).
34 Id.
35 Itiel E. Dror and Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mix-
ture Interpretation, 51 Sci & Just 204, 205 (2011).
36 Andrea Widener and Carmen Drahl, Forcing Change in Forensic Science, 92
Chem & Eng News 10, 14 (May 12, 2014).
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and third, adding or removing variables from a regression can
result in wholesale changes to the results."37
In theory, many of these human factors could be resolved
through robust blinding processes. And remaining factors could
be incorporated into sophisticated error-rate estimates with sig-
nificant investments in error-rate testing with known cases.
However, those estimates will be accurate only to the extent
that they are calibrated to the particular expert rendering an
opinion on a particular case in a particular context. Thus, Gel-
bach's epistemological point would seem to be correct in a van-
ishingly small set of cases.
Even there, while it may be theoretically possible for a
Bayesian fact finder to integrate the two estimates for each ex-
pert's error rate into a single posterior probability, it seems
doubtful that a jury has the capacity or inclination to actually
integrate the expert opinions in this way.38 For practical purposes,
a litigant may have to assume that the fact finders will take ex-
pert opinions at face value, such that a negative and positive
opinion roughly cancel each other out, with unpredictable noise
directing the outcome.
Nonetheless, perhaps one could make Gelbach's point about
litigation strategy in a less formal way. Rather than think about
divergent error rates, let us just recognize the obvious point that
some expert opinions will be more persuasive to the fact finder
than others, and this will remain true for blinded experts.
Therefore, two disagreeing blinded-expert opinions will not neces-
sarily cancel each other out in the eyes of a fact finder. Thus,
when a rational litigant receives an unfavorable blinded opinion,
it may sometimes perceive that-for whatever reason-the opin-
ion is not likely to be very persuasive to the fact finder. If so, the
rational litigant might perceive disclosure of that opinion to be a
rather small cost that does not deter a second draw from the
blinded-expert pool.
However, even in this looser formulation, this analysis over-
looks the alternative strategy of hiding the unfavorable opinion
37 D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 Harv L Rev
533, 544 (2008).
38 Even highly intelligent experts have consistently been shown to fail to properly
integrate information about divergent error rates. See generally A.K. Ghosh, K. Ghosh,
and P.J. Erwin, Do Medical Students and Physicians Understand Probability?, 97 Q J
Med 53 (2004).
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and proceeding with a traditional litigation expert instead.39
Even if a litigant accurately predicts that a fact finder will tend
to discount an unfavorable blinded opinion, the question is
whether that unfavorable blinded opinion will hurt the litigant
more than the blinded-expert protocol helps the litigant. Outside
of convoluted hypothetical situations in which the litigant knows
that the fact finder loves the blinding procedure but hates blinded
opinions favoring one particular side, it will usually be better for
a litigant to hide the unfavorable blinded opinion and proceed
with a traditional unblinded expert instead.
The key point is that traditional litigation remains an out-
side option. Because the disclosure rule is conditional on intro-
ducing a blinded expert at trial, it protects the integrity of the
blinded-expert procedure and thereby preserves it as an epis-
temic signal. In contrast, Gelbach's critique is applicable to other
non-conditional-disclosure mandates, such as that of Judge
Richard Posner.40
CONCLUSION
Professor Gelbach's analogy to data mining sheds light on
one part of the problem of expert bias. In particular, Gelbach
has identified a theoretical situation in which expert mining
might occur within the blinded-expert procedure. Yet we agree
that, even there, it would be largely harmless.41 As the protocol
requires that all blinded opinions be disclosed to the fact finder,
if a litigant discloses any opinion, then the protocol averts selec-
tion bias.
Much more commonly, it remains true that a rational liti-
gant that receives an unfavorable blinded opinion will instead
opt back into the regime of traditional litigation. In those cases,
it is likely that the rational adversary will hire a favorable
blinded expert, who will guide the fact finder to the true an-
swer.42 Blinding remains a valuable epistemic device, a rational
strategy for litigants, and a promising solution for the multifac-
eted problem of expert bias.
39 Gelbach acknowledges elsewhere in his paper that he "will focus on [only one]
aspect" of the blinded-expert proposal. Gelbach, 81 U Chi L Rev at 133 n 10 (cited in note
1). Such a narrow focus may be the source of any confusion.
40 See id at 140, discussing Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of
Evidence, 51 Stan L Rev 1477, 1541 (1999).
41 Gelbach, 81 U Chi L Rev at 141-42, 149 (cited in note 1).
42 See Robertson, 86 NYU L Rev at 217 (cited in note 4).
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